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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The China's rapid economic growth coupled with the weapon modernization 
has caused more concern in most countries, mainly in the Asia Pacific region. 
Even though the Chinese government has explained the reason for the 
development of their military and actively supports economic activities in 
other Pacific countries, it does not reduce the threats felt by certain countries 
in the region, particularly Japan. As a result, Japan had come to make a 
change in military strategy, supported by the United States power. This 
situation further aggravated the peace and security in the Asia Pacific region. 
Not only China and Japan relations will be even hotter, this situation also 
raises concerns of the countries in the region. The presence of the United 
States, unresolved political issues with Taiwan, the increasing tension of the 
seizure of the waters in the East China Sea and South China Sea, coupled with 
the suspicion related to the history of the past, making the action-reaction 
between China and Japan disturb stability in the region. 
 
Keywords: threat perception, security dilemma, action-reaction, military 
strategy. 
 
 
Pesatnya pertumbuhan ekonomi China yang dibarengi modernisasi senjata  
negara ini menimbulkan kekhawatiran negara-negara di kawasan Asia 
Pasifik. Meskipun China telah menjelaskan alasan pembangunan militer di 
negara mereka dan aktif mendukung aktivitas ekonomi negara-negara 
Pasifik lainnya, tetap saja itu tidak mengurangi rasa terancam yang sialami 
negara-negara tertentu di kawasan ini, terutama Jepang. Akibatnya, Jepang 
bereaksi dengan ikut melakukan perubahan strategi militer yang ternyata 
memperburuk perdamaian dan keamanan Asia Pasifik. Bukan saja hubungan 
China dan Jepang menjadi semakin panas, situasi ini juga menimbulkan 
kekhawatiran dari negara-negara di kawasan. Kehadiran Amerika Serikat, 
belum terselesaikannya masalah politik dengan Taiwan, meningkatnya 
ketegangan di Laut China Timur dan Laut China Selatan, dan  sejarah masa 
lalu, membuat aksi-reaksi China dan Jepang semakin mengganggu stabilitas. 
 
Kata-Kata Kunci: persepsi ancaman, dilema keamanan, aksi-reaksi, 
strategi militer. 
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The rise of China, both in economic and military over the last decade, 
has drawn attention to international politics, especially in Asia Pacific. 
Its defense expenditure, increasing 11.7-20.3 per cent annually, (China’s 
National Defense White Paper 1998), according to many observers has 
brought instability to the region. Although the Chinese government has 
acknowledged that its military expenses are reasonable and at 
appropriate level for its economic development, it inevitably leads 
neighbor states in the region to seek greater military capabilities. They 
may strengthen their forces both quantitatively and qualitatively, in 
order to counter-balance China. 
 
Apparently, the security dilemma has occurred in the region. On the one 
hand, China has increased its military expenditure very drastically due to 
arms modernization and security dynamics. On the other hand, the rise 
of China’s military power causes Pacific countries mainly those that 
continue to have political and territorial disputes with China, to feel 
vulnerable and less secure. This situation then forces them to put in 
more efforts to modernize their defense capabilities as a response. This 
is particularly true for Japan, which will be the focus of this paper. In 
response to China military –as well as in relation to North Korea’s 
nuclear program-Japan has significantly changed its defense policy. 
Instead of Russia being a threat as in the case during the Cold War era, 
China and North Korea are now considered as a threat. This is clearly 
mentioned in 2010 Japan’s Defense White Paper.  
 
Accordingly, this paper will analyze the action-reaction between China 
and Japan with regards to their military strategy and whether their 
strategy will promote cooperation or on the contrary provoke 
competition in Asia Pacific.This article will particularly answer some 
questions such as how does Japan perceive China military strategy, 
mainly those in relation to Senkaku/Diayou dispute? What factors have 
triggered Japanese government to change its defense policy? And what is 
the impact of China and Japan’s defense policy towards peace and 
stability in the region? 
 
With regards to Sino-Japan relationship, this paper argues that threat 
perception is the main factor that triggers both countries to enter 
‘security dilemma’. This perception leads them to an action-reaction 
situation in terms of their military strategy. The action-reaction between 
two neighboring countries, involving the United States, not only 
promotes tensions for both parties but also provokes feeling of insecure 
for other Pacific states. Although these two major powers in the region 
have a strong economic cooperation, their defense policies may create 
instability in Pacific region. This is particularly true, as currently 
tensions coupled with some unresolved problems on territorial remains 
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existed. This situation seems less likely to support peace and stability in 
the region. 
 
To elaborate the above mentioned argument, this paper will be divided 
into four sections. First section will describe China’s defense strategy 
and its recent development. Second section will analyze Japan’s 
responses towards China strategy and the change of their defense policy. 
This section will also briefly examine the involvement of United States in 
the region. Thirdly, this paper will explain the impact of Sino-Japan 
action reaction towards peace and stability in Asia Pacific. And 
eventually, this paper will deliver a conclusion. 
 
 
China’s Military Transformation 
 
Military power is obviously needed by states for certain goals and it can 
vary from one state to another. Buzan concludes that military capability 
is used to act intentionally and physically against an object or an 
unwilling person either defensively or offensively (Buzan & Herring 
1998). On the other hand, Art (1980) in his article “To What Ends 
Military Power?”, expands the purposes of deployment of military 
forces.He states that it serves at least four utilities, they are defense, 
deterrence, compellence, and swaggering (Schelling 1966). Although Art 
explained the differences of these purposes explicitly in his paper, in 
practice, these purposes can be confusing and overlapping. It may not be 
easy to distinguish each of these purposes when they are implemented. 
To some extent, it is difficult to ascertain whether a state’s military 
power is used for defense, offence or both purposes -particularly for 
states who have disputes for certain period of time. In addition, it is 
difficult to determine whether a state’s military force applied for 
deterrence or simply exercised swaggering strategy.  
 
The idea of China military system has actually begun since 1930, which 
emphasizes on territorial defense over coastal defense. This strategy was 
part of Mao Zedong’s concept, People’s War, that established human 
power, operation of infantry, and guerilla war. Yet, in 1980s, Den 
Xiaoping revised the People's War in a more sophisticated method. The 
strategy moved away from reliance on troops towards technology. When 
Jiang Zemin took office in 1992, China's defense modernization was 
directed to the doctrine of Limited War under High-Tech Condition and 
focused more on naval capabilities. This doctrine ultimately emphasized 
the importance role of high technology to prepare China’s People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) in limited war (Sukma 1995; Tan En Bok 1984). 
 
In 2011, the Chinese government issued its National Defense White 
Paper 2010 (China’s National Defense White Paper 2011) with a new 
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perspective. They declared the implementation of its “Peaceful 
Development” coupled with the pursuit of defense military strategy. The 
spokesman of China’s Ministry of National Defense mentioned that for 
defensive purpose, the expenditure was mainly used for personnel, 
training, and maintenance, as well as equipment. He explained that the 
increase of China’s military budget in the last five years is to improve the 
PLA’s living standards. This applies to both active and reserve forces. 
The budget is also allocated for supporting the diversified military tasks 
in terms of military operations other than war (MOOTW), and 
encouraging the Revolution Military Affairs (RMA) in this country. 
 
The above official explanation justifies China’s rise in military 
expenditure for at least three reasons. Firstly, the increase of China’s 
military budget is to provide better welfare for its military personnel. 
Along with the economic and social development and the improvement 
of people's living standards, the PLA has adjusted servicemen's salaries 
and allowances, increased funding for education and training, water and 
electricity supplies and heating, upgraded logistics support for grass-
roots units in a comprehensive and coordinated way, and improved the 
on-duty, training and living conditions of border and coastal defense 
forces and units in remote areas and harsh environments. 
 
Secondly, the Chinese government is willing to modernize their 
armaments to counter threats coming from non-state actors –which they 
have been doing for more than a decade. As mentioned in its 2010 
defense paper, China has increased investment in improving MOOTW 
capabilities. This is significantly implemented in supporting earthquake 
rescue and disaster relief operations, in escort operations in the Gulf of 
Aden and waters off Somalia, in flood control and emergency rescue 
operations, and in international rescue operations.  
 
Thirdly, the expenditure is an attempt to maintain and modernize its 
weaponries. It is believed that China is emphasizing on domestic 
production of sophisticated military equipment and parts, which by now 
remains imported from Russia. China’s national defense industry sector 
is also actively doing research and making development, supported by its 
economic growth, to modernize its military technology particularly for 
its naval, missile, and space exploration (The U.S. Defense Department’s 
Annual Report to Congress 2011). 
 
However, China’s defense strategy inevitably threatens both its potential 
adversaries and actual opponents, mainly those who remain managed 
unresolved problems with China. This is to mention Japan in 
Senkaku/Diayou sea territorial dispute, Taiwan with “One China Policy” 
and South East Asian countries with regards to South China Sea 
overlapping claims. They may perceive that China’s defensive strategy 
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can also be applied as an offensive one. China’s military capabilities in 
fact have similar ability to force other states either to stop what they are 
doing at the moment or ask them to do something that the Chinese 
government wants.  
 
In addition, some observers remain worried about China’s military 
modernization efforts. Its defense strategy allows Chinese government to 
build its naval, air and missile forces by procuring nuclear-powered 
submarines, frigates, amphibious landing craft warships, fighter-
bombers, and destroyers. These destroyers are also completed with 
supersonics and anti-ship cruise missiles. Chinese government has 
started these procurements since 2000 (Bitzinger 2007). In 2010, China 
also bought 15 S-300 anti-aircraft missiles from Russia, having a range 
of more than 150 km and travel at minimum 2 km per second. Moreover, 
China has just launched its first aircraft carrier  and obviously China will 
continue its military procurement (Reuters 2011). The Chinese 
government may justify its military modernization is driven by 
three reasons. Firstly, as written in its White Paper, it is for non-
conventional threats’ anticipation. Secondly, China government 
intends to create peace and security in the East Asia region. 
Therefore eventually, as stated by Zhu Chenghu, in the Seminar on 
“Future East Asian Security-A Chinese Perspective,” RSIS 
Singapore, 23 September 2011, is to make East Asia region 
independent from external power. Nevertheless, while anticipating 
non-traditional threats, China has to manage some traditional 
problems, as above mentioned.  
 
Furthermore, China has a fragile relationship with US due to its 
perception towards US hegemonic behavior particularly in Pacific 
region, US security alliance with Japan and US support given to Taiwan 
and South Korea. China is also facing questions from neighboring states 
regarding its transparency in publishing its military expenses. Therefore, 
China’s arms build-up could be perceived as a significant threat by other 
countries, particularly for Japan and states in Pacific region, which is the 
prime attention in this paper.  
 
 
Japan’s Perception and the US Involvement 
 
Military power can be used as threats as well as rewards (Rousseau 
2007). For realist scholars, military power remains the most important 
aspect among other elements of national power. However, in this 
anarchical system the realist will argue that military power will make 
you feel more threatened than being rewarded. This perception is 
heightened when a neighbor state acquires more power than your state. 
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In this respect, Rousseau (2007) argues that the weak position of one’s 
military power increases the perception of threat. This happens because 
nothing in this self-help international system can prevent one state from 
using force against others to resolve a conflict (Ka Po Ng 2005). 
 
Accordingly, threat perception can be created when a state feels insecure 
or less secure due to other’s arms dynamics. Although Cohen (1979) says 
a threat can be inferred either from a certain signal of intention or the 
adversary’s capability, the perception itself is worsened when the 
motives and the reasons behind the other’s military build-up are 
ambiguity. Moreover, it is not easy to figure out a state’s military 
acquisition purpose by examining its motives and reasons stated in the 
government’s documents or declared by its spokesmen. A state may 
explain its intention and justification to modernize its weapon through 
defense diplomacy as well as encourage confident building measure. Yet, 
it cannot stop others from having their own perception towards its 
strategy. Moreover, a less secure perception due to other states’ military 
modernization most likely provokes security dilemma, as stated by 
Kegley and Wittkopf (2001). They conclude security dilemma as: “The 
central problem faced by all sovereign states in an anarchic global 
system in which a state’s arming for ostensibly defensive purposes 
provokes other states to arm in response, with the result that the 
national security of all declines as their armaments increase.” May Rudi 
(2002) also confirm security dilemma as a process where all parties feel 
insecure. This happens primarily when defensive militarystrategy of a 
state perceived as an offensive posture by others, which in turn requires 
others to rearm for the sake of their national security.  
 
As far as Japan is concerned, North Korea’s nuclear proliferation and 
China’s military transformation impacted its defense strategy 
significantly. This is in addition to Sino-North Korea relationship and 
China support to North Korea’s nuclear program (Ong 2007). Although 
Japan and China economic relations are strengthened, their political and 
security relations remain fragile (Horimoto 2005). The memory of 
Japan’s invasion to China in World War II and their overlapping claims 
towards Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are still affecting their relations. Thus, 
Japan views China’s effort to modernize its military power as an attempt 
that is not only aimed at dealing with non-traditional threats but also 
traditional threats.  
 
Japanese government may perceive China military capability is used as a 
tool to expand its position in global politics. However, China may also 
use them to force Taiwan with regards to its independence and probably 
to repel Japan from Senkaku/Diaoyu islands imminently. This 
perception is in line with Japan’s Defense White Paper 2010, stating: 
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In its military modernization China appears to give particular priority to 
the Taiwan issue as an issue of national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and for the time being it will probably aim for the improvement 
of military capabilities to prevent Taiwan’s independence and others, but 
in recent years, China has begun to work on acquiring capabilities for 
missions other than the Taiwan issue. The military trends of China draw 
attention from countries in the region, as the country has been steadily 
growing as a major political and economic power in the region. 
 
Japan has viewed China’s arms build-up particularly in navy capabilities 
as a threat since they have the East China Sea dispute to settle. Japan-
China negotiation on the oil and gas deposits in this water has not come 
to end yet. Therefore, the escalation activities of Chinese naval near the 
gas and oil field in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have led to Japan’s 
concern. Regarding this issue, a retired Lieutenant General and Corps 
Commander of Japan’s Northern Army, who later became a professor at 
Teikyo University, says, “We do not have any concern about their land 
forces, only maritime forces like the navy and missiles. A drastic 
expansion of that kind of capability could be a threat in the future.” 
(BBC 2011). 
 
In response to China’s armed forces modernization and North Korea’s 
nuclear proliferation program, Japan has revised its defense strategy 
over the last decade. Japanese government arranged a New Defense 
Program Outlines (NDPO), starting from 2001. The strategy mainly 
prepares JSDF (Japan Self-Defense Forces) to support the US campaign 
war on terrorism in Afghanistan and United Nations Peace Keeping 
Operation. Yet, for the first time, after its security agreement with US in 
1951, Japan was approved its own power projection capabilities that 
made it procured UH-60JA multi role helicopters, Hawk surface-to-air 
missiles, landing ship tank for helicopters and destroyer-helicopter ships 
(IISS 2011). 
 
The above strategy certainly applied with a stronger cooperation with US 
and an intention to play a greater role in both regional and global 
security. To support its global goals, Japan has also proposed “Dynamic 
Defense Force” strategy, which permits its Defense Minister to shift the 
land forces to mobile forces. Recently, Japan is acquiring six new 
submarines, equipped with two more warships with Aegis missile and 
building three additional ground-based missile defense units–systems 
(The Stripes 2011). Japan is benefited from its security agreement with 
US. The agreement allows the Japanese government to develop and 
deploy it missile defense systems, primarily with US technology. 
 
At the same time, in November 2011, the US government has once again 
performed its intention to play a greater role in Asia Pacific. In front of 
the Asia Pacific leaders during East Asia summit in Indonesia, President 
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Obama specifically explained the vital role of Pacific Rim for the US 
interest. Ultimately, Obama urged the need to secure and protect the US’ 
and her partners’ interest in maritime Asia Pacific (New York Times 
2011). The initiative to focus more on Asia Pacific has actually been 
proposed since 2001. The US Department of Defense published her 
defense strategy that demands her armed forces to provide flexible 
capabilities (Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001; Kugler 2002). 
These capabilities ultimately are aimed for wider purposes and 
contingencies as they intended to expand their overseas presence from 
Middle East to Pacific Ocean. The 2001 defense strategy is then 
supported by the 2007 maritime strategy, which also justifies the shift of 
US naval focus to Pacific oceans (Holmes 2011). 
 
The 2007 maritime strategy essentially allows the US sea services, 
namely the US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, to cooperate and 
station a credible combat power in the Western Pacific and the Indian 
Ocean. The US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates (2010), confirmed 
that as part of Pacific nations, the US intentionally addresses Asia Pacific 
region within its defense priorities. This priority demonstrates that 
maintaining a safe and secure sea lane as well as upholding the principle 
of freedom of navigation in Pacific waters have become the core of US’ 
interest (John F. Bradford 2011; Gates 2008). This explains the US 
desires for an openness and common use of spaces, including the sea, 
ultimately for its mutual interests and its allies’ in the region such as 
Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. 
 
In the sense of naval development, the US sea power confirms its post-
modern navy attribute, whose strategy is essentially cooperative and 
forwards geographically (Till 2009). The US maritime strategy, as 
mentioned by the Commander Pacific Fleet, U.S. Navy, Admiral Robert 
Willard (2009), asks maritime power of friendly nations to work 
together with the US Navy to maintain the security of the global 
maritime.This is also to support what has been mentioned by Admiral 
Samuel Locklear, commander of the U.S Third Fleet, “…. no one country 
can maintain the global security environment. It requires us working 
together.” (Starbulletin 2011). 
 
The US Global Maritime Strategy thus encourages US’ allies in Asia 
Pacific, namely the Philippines, Japan, South Korea and Australia, to 
collaborate and have joint military exercise with the US Navy. The 
annual RIMPAC (Rim Pacific) naval exercise in 2008 reported the well 
conduct of this strategy. The exercise involved at least 10 navies, 35 
warships, 6 submarines, 150 aircrafts and 20.000 marines, sailors, 
airmen, and coast guard. (Starbulletin 2011). This joint exercise 
positively strengthens the military ties between the US and her allies as 
well as promotes their capability. In RIMPAC, these ally states may also 
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have opportunity to share information, enhance the intelligence 
capacity, and transfer technology.  
 
 
Instability in the Region 
 
However, the US maritime strategy in Asia Pacific might provoke the 
US-Sino relationship, which remains vulnerable in the last decade. 
Although their relations have been marked by an increased in strategic 
dialogue and partnership on several issues, such as the North Korea’s 
nuclear proliferation and mutually foreign investment, they continue to 
have some problems. These problems mainly are resulted from China’s 
perception on US hegemonic behavior in Pacific regions, mutual security 
cooperation between Japan and US, as well as US support to Taiwan. 
This situation, to some extent, has provoked China to modernize its 
naval capabilities, which in turn intensifies the US-Sino tension (Cole 
2010). 
 
On the other hand, US possess a negative perception on China’s 
transparency, particularly in exercising its military progress. This is in 
addition to the economic competition coupled with US-China currency 
war, human rights problems in China, and the issue of Taiwan. 
(Scalapino 2004; Chang & Chao 2009). US also has a deep concern on 
China’s strategy to approach several Southeast Asian countries that is 
predicted to replace US’s role in the region, with a more positive image 
on China’s side (Sutter 2010). 
 
With regards to Sino-Japan relationships, both countries have shown 
dramatic power acquisitions. Yet, it is too early to evaluate if they are 
heading for war. The gap of military capability between China and Japan 
remains too wide, which prevents Japan to activate war first. In 
addition, to some observers, their interdependence in trade and 
investments restrains them from doing regrettable actions. Nevertheless, 
their action-reaction on arms dynamic causes an inevitable security 
dilemma in the region.  
 
As confirmed by Jervis (1976), security dilemma provokes tensions. In 
this case, the action-reaction between China and Japan not only promote 
tensions for both parties, but also creates insecurity for other states in 
the region. Currently tensions coupled with some existing territorial 
problems with neighboring countries trigger instability in Asia Pacific. In 
the case of South China Sea, for example, China’s military strategy has 
also led its neighbors to react in a similar strategy. As confirmed in its 
Defense Policy, Vietnam has developed its defense powers and closely 
coordinated defense-security and diplomatic activities in the last decade. 
The 2006 defense budget was increased 20.89% from USD 781.34 
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million to USD 987.70 million. It was then increased by 28.85% in 2007 
and became USD 1,388.26 million. It was slightly decreased in 2008, but 
then dramatically increased to become USD 2,6 billion in 2011 and USD 
3,3 billion in 2012 (Vietnam National Defense Paper 2012). 
 
Like Vietnam, the Philippines have also established a transformation in 
its defense strategy since 2003. Under the Philippines Defense Reform, 
the government focuses on ten key areas, such as improvement of 
operational and training capacity, improvement of logistics capacity, 
personnel management systems, and level expertise, optimizing the 
defense budget and improving management controls, and also 
increasing the capability of the Armed Forces of Philippines to conduct 
civil military operations (Philippines Defense Reform 2012). Initially, 
along with the US, the defense reform is directed to respond the 9/11 
terrorist’s attack. Yet, the program is specifically containing the mission 
to protect the Philippines national territory and Philippines’ Exclusive 
Economic Zone from external aggression and transnational threats (The 
Guardian 2012). 
 
Moreover, the Philippines government has performed an assertive stand 
towards China, with regard to Scarborough Shoal issue, since 1994. A 
recent stand-off has just ensued when a Philippine navy surveillance 
plane sighted eight Chinese fishing vessels anchored in a lagoon at 
Scarborough in April 2012. Based on a report form Filipino sailors, the 
Philippines navy then deployed its largest warship, the BRP Gregorio del 
Pilar to the region (The Guardian 2012).The Philippines later withdrew 
its warship, but China sent out two Fishery Law Enforcement Command 
vessels. China’s act obviously provokes stand-off to escalate, with the 
Philippines requesting a diplomatic resolution to the crisis but refusing 
to retreat.  Bilateral relations have quickly deteriorated, as China 
introduces restrictions on imports of Philippine bananas and calls on 
tour groups to leave, causing a severe blow to the Philippine economy.  
Moreover, the Chinese media is talking of war and provoking both 
citizens, although a fishing ban implemented by both sides may let 
tensions subside (Telegraph 2012). 
 
Instability in the region, to some extent, is also filled by both Japan and 
China historical record. Japan was an invader during the World War II 
and created severe pains for many Pacific states. Thus, its military 
development and defense cooperation with US might be considered a 
threat. Similarly, China is assumed as a revisionist power in the way it 
dominates Pacific waters and approaches Taiwan. Although China 
government tries to manage some negotiations and arrange economic 
cooperation with Southeast Asian countries and Taiwan, they still use 
“carrot and stick” approaches. China combines its assistances with 
coercion and intimidation to support its goals. This can be clearly seen, 
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for example, in its “One China” policy, as President Hu Jintao ratified 
the “Anti-Secession Law” in March 2005 (Chang & Chao 2009). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The reality of China and Japan as major powers in Pacific region is a 
truth. Economic developments in the two countries coupled with 
military modernization signalize their superiority. Their trade and 
investments interdependence certainly support their positive 
relationship. Nevertheless, a significant transformation in China’s 
defense power to a greater extent brings instability to the region. 
Although Chinese government has explained their peaceful 
development, neighboring states perceive oppositely. Japan, Taiwan and 
several Southeast Asian countries, which have traditional problems with 
China, consider the strategy as a threat.  
 
As a response, Pacific states conduct military modernization. Japan in 
particular, who relishes mutual defense cooperation with United States, 
strongly utilizes their strategic partnership and promotes significantly its 
self-defense power. Yet, this counter-balance strategy leads both states 
to an unresolved tension. The tension also impacts to the stability in Asia 
Pacific region. Some political and territorial disputes coupled with 
historical suspiciousness fulfill the relationships of Pacific states. 
Although economic interdependence prevents their robust military 
activities, the tension should be sent down to maintain the peace and 
stability. This ultimately needs political willingness from all parties in 
Pacific region to self-restraint, build trust one to another and arrange 
comprehensive strategic partnerships.  
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